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Abstract
Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to
game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite
time horizon with discounted rewards. The players are assumed to have infinite strategy spaces and
the payoffs are assumed to be polynomials. In this paper we restrict our attention to a special class of
games for which the single-controller assumption holds. It is shown that minimax equilibria and optimal
strategies for such games may be obtained via semidefinite programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Markov decision processes (MDPs) are very widely used system modeling tools where a
single agent attempts to make optimal decisions at each stage of a multi-stage process so as to
optimize some reward or payoff [1]. Game theory is a system modeling paradigm that allows
one to model problems where several (possibly adversarial) decision makers make individual
decisions to optimize their own payoff [2]. In this paper we study stochastic games [3], a
framework that combines the modeling power of MDPs and games. Stochastic games may be
viewed as competitive MDPs where several decision makers make decisions at each stage to
maximize their own reward. Each state of a stochastic game is a simple game, but the decisions
made by the players affect not only their current payoff, but also the transition to the next state.
This research was funded in part by AFOSR MURI subawards 2003-07688-1 and 102-1080673.
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2Notions of solutions in games have been extensively studied, and are very well understood.
The most popular notion of a solution in game theory is that of a Nash equilibrium. While these
equilibria are hard to compute in general, in certain cases they may be computed efficiently.
For games involving two players and finite action spaces, mixed strategy minimax equilibria
always exist (see, e.g., [2]). These minimax saddle points correspond to the well-known notion
of a Nash equilibrium. From a computational standpoint such games are considered tractable
because Nash equilibria may be computed efficiently via linear programming. Stochastic games
were introduced by Shapley [4] in 1953. In his paper, he showed that the notion of a minimax
equilibrium may be extended to stochastic games with finite state spaces and strategy sets. He
also proposed a value iteration-like algorithm to compute the equilibria. In 1981 Parthasarathy
and Raghavan [5], [3] studied single controller games. Single controller games are games where
the probabilities of transitions are controlled by the action of only one player. They showed
that stochastic games satisfying this property could be solved efficiently via linear programming
(thus proving that such problems with rational data could be computed in a finite number of
steps).
While computational techniques for finite games are reasonably well understood, there has
been some recent interest in the class of infinite games; see [6], [7] and the references therein.
In this important class, players have access to an infinite number of pure strategies, and the
players are allowed to randomize over these choices. In a recent paper [6], Parrilo describes a
technique to solve two-player, zero-sum infinite games with polynomial payoffs via semidefinite
programming. It is natural to wonder whether the techniques from finite stochastic games can
be extended to infinite stochastic games (i.e. finite state stochastic games where players have
access to infinitely many pure strategies). In particular, since finite, single-controller, zero-sum
games can be solved via linear programming, can similar infinite stochastic games be solved
via semidefinite programming? The answer is affirmative, and this paper focuses on establishing
this result.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a computationally efficient, finite dimensional
characterization of the solution of single-controller polynomial stochastic games. For this, we
extend the linear programming formulation that solves the finite action single-controller stochastic
game (i.e., under assumption (SC) below), to an infinite dimensional optimization problem when
the actions are uncountably infinite. We furthermore establish the following properties of this
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3infinite dimensional optimization problem:
1) Its optimal solutions correspond to minimax equilibria.
2) The problem can be solved efficiently by semidefinite programming.
Section II of this paper provides a formal description of the problem and introduces the basic
notation used in the paper. We show that for two-player zero-sum polynomial stochastic games,
equilibria exist and that the corresponding equilibrium value vector is unique. (This proof is
essentially an adaptation of the original proof by Shapley in [4] for finite stochastic games). In
Section II we also briefly review some elegant results about polynomial nonnegativity, moment
sequences of nonnegative measures, and their connection to semidefinite programming. In Sec-
tion III, we briefly review the linear programming approach to finite stochastic games. Section IV
states and proves the main result of this paper. In Section V we present an example of a two-
player, two-state stochastic game, and compute the equilibria via semidefinite programming.
Finally, in Section VI we state some natural extensions of this problem, conclusions, and
directions of future research.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. Stochastic games
We consider the problem of solving two-player zero-sum stochastic games via mathematical
programming. The game consists of finitely many states with two adversarial players that make
simultaneous decisions. Each player receives a payoff that depends on the actions of both players
and the state (i.e. each state can be thought of as a particular zero-sum game). The transitions
between the states are random (as in a finite state Markov decision process), and the transition
probabilities in general depend on the actions of the players and the current state. The process
runs over an infinite horizon. Player 1 attempts to maximize his reward over the horizon (via
a discounted accumulation of the rewards at each stage) while player 2 tries to minimize his
payoff to player 1. If (a11, a21, . . .) and (a12, a22, . . .) are sequences of actions chosen by players 1
and 2 resulting in a sequence of states (s1, s2, . . .) respectively, then the reward of player 1 is
given by:
∞∑
k=1
βkr(sk, a
k
1, a
k
2).
The game is completely defined via the specification of the following data:
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Fig. 1. A two state stochastic game. The payoff functions associated to the states are denoted by r1 and r2. The edges are
marked by the corresponding state transition probabilities.
1) The (finite) state space S = {1, . . . , S}.
2) The sets of actions for players 1 and 2 given by A1 and A2.
3) The payoff function, denoted by r(s, a1, a2), for a given set of state s and actions a1 and
a2 (of players 1 and 2).
4) The probability transition matrix p(s′; s, a1, a2) which provides the conditional probability
of transition from state s to s′ given players’ actions.
5) The discount factor β, where 0 ≤ β < 1.
To fix ideas, consider the following example of a two-state stochastic game (i.e. S = {1, 2}).
The action spaces of the two players are A1 = A2 = [0, 1]. The payoff function in state 1 is
r(1, a1, a2) = r1(a1, a2) and the payoff function in state 2 is given by r(2, a1, a2) = r2(a1, a2).
Both are assumed to be polynomials in a1 and a2. The probability transition matrix is:
P =

 p11(a1, a2) p12(a1, a2)
p21(a1, a2) p22(a1, a2)

 .
Every entry in this matrix is assumed to be a polynomial in a1 and a2. This stochastic game can
be depicted graphically as shown in Fig. 1. We will return to a specific instance of this example
in Section V, where we explicitly solve for the equilibrium strategies of the two players.
Through most of this paper (except Section II-C) we make the following important assumption
about the probability transition matrix:
Assumption SC
The probability transition to state s′ conditioned upon the current state being s depends only on
s, s′, and the action a1 of player 1 for every s and s′. This probability is independent of the action
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5of player 2. Thus, p(s′; s, a1, a2) = p(s′; s, a1). This is known as the single-controller assumption.
In this paper we will mostly (except briefly, in Section III where finite strategy spaces are
considered) be concerned with the case where the action spaces A1 and A2 of the two players
are uncountably infinite sets. For the sake of simplicity we will often consider the case where
A1 = A2 = [0, 1] ∈ R. The results easily generalize to the case where the strategy sets are
finite unions of arbitrary intervals of the real line. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume
that the action sets are the same for each state, though this assumption may be relaxed. We will
denote by a1 and a2, the actual actions chosen by players 1 and 2 from their respective action
spaces. The payoff function is assumed to be a polynomial in the variables a1 and a2 with real
coefficients:
r(s, a1, a2) =
d1∑
i=1
d2∑
j=1
rij(s)a
i
1a
j
2.
Finally, we assume that the transition probability p(s′; s, a1) is a polynomial in the action a1.
The decision process runs over an infinite horizon, thus it is natural to restrict one’s attention
to stationary strategies for each player, i.e. strategies that depend only on the state of the process
and not on time. Moreover, since the process involves two adversarial decision makers, it is also
natural to look for randomized strategies (or mixed strategies) rather than pure strategies so as
to recover the notion of a minimax equilibrium. A mixed strategy for player 1 is a finite set
of probability measures µ = [µ(1), . . . , µ(S)] supported on the action set A1. Each probability
measure corresponds to a randomized strategy for player 1 in some particular state, for example
µ(k) corresponds to the randomized strategy that player 1 would use when in state k. Similarly,
player 2’s strategy will be represented by ν = [ν(1), . . . , ν(S)]. (A word on notation: Throughout
the paper, indices in parentheses will be used to denote the state. Bold letters will be used indicate
vectorization with respect to the state, i.e., collection of objects corresponding to different states
into a vector with the ith entry corresponding to state i. The Greek letters ξ, µ, ν will be
used to denote measures. Subscripts on these Greek letters will be used to denote moments
of the measures. A bar over a greek letter indicates a (finite) moment sequence (the length of
the sequence being clear from the context). For example ξj(i) denotes the jth moment of the
measure ξ corresponding to state i, and ξ¯(i) = [ξ0(i), . . . , ξn(i)]).
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6A strategy µ leads to a probability transition matrix P (µ) such that Pij(µ) =
∫
A1
p(j; i, a1)dµ(i).
Thus, once player 1 fixes a strategy µ, the probability transition matrix is fixed, and can be
obtained by integrating each entry in the matrix with respect to the measure µ. (Since the entries
are polynomials, upon integration, these entries depend affinely on the moments µ(i)). Given
strategies µ and ν, the expected reward collected by player 1 in some stage s is given by:
r(s, µ(s), ν(s)) =
∫
A1
∫
A2
r(s, a1, a2)dµ(s)dν(s).
The reward collected over the infinite horizon (for fixed strategies µ(s) and ν(s)) starting at
state s, vβ(s, µ(s), ν(s)), is given by the system of equations:
vβ(s, µ(s), ν(s)) = r(s, µ(s), ν(s))+
β
∑
s′∈S
(∫
A1
p(s′; s, a1)dµ(s)
)
vβ(s
′, µ(s′), ν(s′)) ∀s.
Vectorizing vβ(s, µ(s), ν(s)), we obtain
vβ(µ, ν) = (I − βP (µ))
−1r(µ, ν),
where r(µ, ν) = [r(1, µ(1), ν(1)), . . . , r(S, µ(S), ν(S))] ∈ RS.
B. Solution Concept
We now briefly discuss the question: “What is a reasonable solution concept for stochastic
games?” Recall that for zero-sum normal form games, a Nash equilibrium is a widely used
notion of equilibrium in competitive scenarios. A Nash equilibrium in a two-player game is a
pair of independent randomized strategies (say µ and ν, one for each player) such that, given
player 2 plays the ν, player 1’s best response would be to play µ and vice-versa. It is an easy
exercise that computation of Nash equilibria is equivalent to finding saddle points of the payoff-
function. It is also well-known that Nash equilibria (or equivalently saddle points) correspond
to the minimax notion of an equilibrium, i.e. points that satisfy the following equality:
min
µ
max
ν
v(µ, ν) = max
ν
min
µ
v(µ, ν).
While there may exist no pure strategies that satisfy this equality, it may be achieved by allowing
randomization over the allowable strategies.
In his seminal paper [4], Shapley generalized the notion of Nash equilibria to stochastic games.
He defined the notion of a “stationary equilibrium” to be a pair of randomized strategies (over
October 26, 2018 DRAFT
7the action space) that depended only on the state of the game. (Of course, to be an equilibrium,
these mixed strategies must also satisfy the no-deviation principle). For stochastic games, once
one restricts attention to stationary equilibria, instead of having unique “values” (as in normal
form games), one has a unique “value vector”. This vector is indexed by the state and the ith
component is interpreted as the equilibrium value Player 1 can expect to receive (over the infinite
discounted process) conditioned on the fact that the game starts in state i. Note that different
states of the game may be favorable to different players. Since the actions affect both payoffs
and state transitions, players must balance their strategies so that they receive good payoffs in
a particular state along with favorable state transitions. The “no unilateral deviation” principle,
saddle point inequality (interpreted row-wise, i.e., conditioned upon a particular state) and the
equivalence of the minmax and maxmin over randomized strategies all extend to the stochastic
game case, and when we restrict attention to games with just one state, we recover the classical
notions of equilibrium.
Definition 1: A pair of vector of mixed strategies (indexed by the state) µ0 and ν0 which
satisfy the saddle point property:
vβ(µ, ν
0) ≤ vβ(µ
0, ν0) ≤ vβ(µ
0, ν) (1)
for all (vectors of) mixed strategies µ, ν are called equilibrium strategies. The corresponding
vector vβ(µ0, ν0) is called the value vector of the game.
One should note that vβ(µ, ν) is a vector in RS indexed by the initial state of the Markov
process. Hence the above inequality is a vector inequality and is to be interpreted componentwise.
More precisely, if A is the action space, let ∆(A) denote the space of probability measures
supported on A. Then the function vβ is a function of the form:
vβ : Π
S
i=1∆(A)× Π
S
i=1∆(A)→ R
S,
and equilibrium strategies correspond to the saddle-points of this function. The mixed strategies
of the players are indexed by the state (i.e. there is one probability measure per state per player).
These probability measures (conditioned upon the state) are independent across states, and are
also independent across the players.
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8C. Existence of Equilibria
In his original paper, Shapley [4] showed that stationary equilibria always exist (and that
the corresponding value-vectors are unique) for two-player, zero-sum, finite state, finite action
stochastic games. (Shapley considered games where at each state there was some probability of
termination, where as in this paper we consider games over an infinite horizon with discounted
rewards, as already mentioned. These two formulations are equivalent in the sense that starting
from a discounted game one can construct a game with termination probabilities and vice-
versa such that both have the same equilibrium value vectors.) In this subsection we address
the existence and uniqueness issue, and prove that for two-player, zero-sum stochastic games
over finite state spaces, infinite strategy spaces, and polynomial payoffs, stationary equilibria
always exist, and that the value vectors are unique. Throughout the paper, we assume that the
transition probabilities are polynomial functions of the actions of the players. It is important to
note that the results of this subsection do not depend upon the single-controller assumption. As
a by-product of this proof, we obtain a simple algorithm for computing equilibria for all such
games. This algorithm is analogous to policy-iteration in dynamic programming, and consists of
solving a sequence of simple (non-stochastic) games whose value-vectors converge to the true
value vector.
Let p(x, y) be a polynomial, and A = [0, 1] be the strategy space of players 1 and 2. Let
val(p(x, y)) be the value of the zero-sum polynomial game with the payoff function as p(x, y)
and the strategy space A. It can be shown that a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists
for two-player zero-sum polynomial games [8], and they can be computed using semidefinite
programming [6].
Lemma 1: Let p1(x, y) and p2(x, y) be given polynomials. Then
|val(p1(x, y))− val(p2(x, y))| ≤ max
x,y∈[0,1]
|p1(x, y)− p2(x, y)|.
Proof: Let µ1, ν1 be the optimal strategies for the polynomial zero-sum game with payoff
p1(x, y) (so that Eµ1,ν1[p1(x, y)] = val(p1(x, y))) and µ2, ν2 be the optimal strategies for the
game with payoff p2(x.y). If val(p1) = val(p2) the result is trivial, so without loss of generality,
assume that val(p1) > val(p2). By the saddle point property,∫
p1(x, y)dµ1dν2 ≥
∫
p1(x, y)dµ1dν1 ≥
∫
p2(x, y)dµ2dν2 ≥
∫
p2(x, y)dµ1dν2.
October 26, 2018 DRAFT
9Here the first inequality follows by considering ν2 to be a deviation of player 2 from his optimal
strategy (i.e. ν1) for the game with payoff p1, the second inequality follows by the preceding
assumption, and the third inequality follows from a deviation argument for player 1 from his
optimal strategy. Hence,∣∣∫ p1(x, y)dµ1dν1 − ∫ p2(x, y)dµ2dν2∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∫ (p1(x, y)− p2(x, y))dµ1dν2∣∣
≤ maxx,y∈[0,1] |(p1(x, y)− p2(x, y))|
∫
dµ1dν2.
Note that the quantity on the right is bounded because we are considering the maximum of a
bounded continuous function on a compact set. Let α ∈ RS . Given a polynomial game with
payoff functions r(s, a1, a2) and transition probabilities p(t; s, a1, a2) (sometimes we will hide
the state indices and write the entire matrix as P (a1, a2)), fix a state s and define the polynomial
Gs(α) = r(s, a1, a2) + β
∑
t∈S p(t; s, a1, a2)αt. We will need to perform iterations using this
vector α ∈ RS. We call the iterates of these vectors αk ∈ RS (k is the iteration index), and
denote sth component of this vector by αks . Pick the vector α0 ∈ RS arbitrarily and define the
recursion for the sth component at iteration k by:
αks = val(G
s(αk−1)), k = 1, 2, . . .
Rephrasing the above in terms of operators, define Ts to be the operator such that
Tsα = val(G
s(α)).
Let Tα = [T1α, . . . TSα]T .Then the recursion simply consists of computing the terms T k(α).
Lemma 2: The quantity
lim
k→∞
T k(α) = φ
exists and is independent of α. Moreover, φ is the unique fixed point solution to the equation:
φ = Tφ.
Proof: For α ∈ RS define the norm ‖α‖ = maxs |αs|. Then,
‖Tγ − Tα‖ = maxs |val(G
s(γ))− val(Gs(α))|
≤ maxsmaxa1,a2∈[0,1] |β
∑
t p(t; s, a1, a2)(γt − αt)| (using Lemma 1)
≤ maxsmaxa1,a2∈[0,1] |β
∑
t p(t; s, a1, a2)|maxt |(γt − αt)|
= β‖γ − α‖.
October 26, 2018 DRAFT
10
Since the discount factor β < 1, we have a contraction, and by the contraction mapping principle,
the iteration T kα is convergent to the unique fixed point of the equation Tφ = φ.
Lemma 2 establishes that a fixed point solution to the iteration exists. We now show that the
fixed point is in fact the value vector of the game. To show this, we show that if we compute
the optimal strategies µ(s), ν(s) to the game Gs(φ), s = 1, 2, . . . , S then play according to these
these strategies achieves the value vector φ. Since φ by definition satisfies the saddle point
inequality (1), an equilibrium solution exists. To show that the value vector is unique, we show
that any value vector satisfies the fixed point equation Tvβ = vβ. Since there is a unique fixed
point by Lemma 2, the value vector must be unique.
Theorem 1: Let φ be the fixed point defined in Lemma 2. Then,
a. Let µ(s), ν(s) denote the optimal measures to the polynomial game with payoff Gs(φ), s =
{1, . . . , S}. Then µ = [µ(1), . . . , µ(S)]T , ν = [ν(1), . . . , ν(S)]T are the optimal strategies
for the stochastic game.
b. If vβ(µ, ν) is a value vector for the game then vβ satisfies Tvβ = vβ. Hence vβ = φ exists
and is unique.
Proof: Let µ(s) and ν(s) be the optimal strategies for the game Gs(φ). Then by definition,
the expected value of play under these strategies will be φs = Tsφ = . . . = T ks φ. Vectorizing
this equation, we note that
φ = T kφ = Eµ,ν [r(a1, a2)+βP (a1, a2)r(a1, a2)+· · ·+β
k−1P k−1(a1, a2)r(a1, a2)+β
kP k(a1, a2)φ].
Taking the limit as k → ∞, we obtain that φ = Eµ,ν [
∑
∞
k=0 β
kP k(a1, a2)r(a1, a2)] = vβ(µ, ν).
Hence playing according to the stationary strategies µ(s), ν(s), s = 1, . . . , S achieves the value
vector φ. Suppose player 1 plays according to the strategy µ, and suppose player 2 deviates from
the prescribed stationary strategy ν to stationary strategy ν ′. Then, since µ, ν are defined to be
an equilibrium strategies for the game Gs(φ), we have the (vector) inequality for all ν ′:
φ = Eµ,ν [r(a1, a2) + βP (a1, a2)φ]
≤ Eµ,ν′[r(a1, a2) + βP (a1, a2)φ]
≤ Eµ,ν′[r(a1, a2) + βP (a1, a2)r(a1, a2) + β
2P 2(a1, a2)φ]
.
.
.
≤ Eµ,ν′[r(a1, a2) + βP (a1, a2)r(a1, a2) + · · ·+ β
kP k(a1, a2)r(a1, a2) + β
kP k(a1, a2)φ].
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In the first inequality a φ occurs on the right side. We substitute that inequality in the φ on the
right side to obtain the second inequality and so on. Finally, we obtain the inequality:
φ = Eµ,ν
[
∞∑
k=0
βkP k(a1, a2)r(a1, a2)
]
≤ Eµ,ν′
[
∞∑
k=0
βkP k(a1, a2)r(a1, a2)
]
,
i.e. that φ = vβ(µ, ν) ≤ vβ(µ, ν ′) for all ν ′. A similar argument for deviations µ′ of player 1
shows that vβ(µ′, ν) ≤ vβ(µ, ν) = φ. Hence µ(s), ν(s) constructed as the strategies for the games
Gs(φ) satisfy the saddle point inequality (1) component-wise. This establishes the existence of
equilibria. For uniqueness, note that any strategies µ, ν such that vβ(µ, ν) satisfies the saddle
point inequality (1), by definition we have Tvβ(µ, ν) = vβ(µ, ν). Since T has a unique fixed
point, the vector vβ(µ, ν) must be unique.
It is interesting to note that the above proof also provides an algorithm to compute approximate
equilibria. To compute each iterate Ts(α) one needs to solve a polynomial game in normal form
(which can be done by solving a single semidefinite program), and by solving a sequence of such
problems, one can compute T k(α) which is provably close to the actual value-vector. However,
the rate of convergence of this iteration is not very attractive. In the rest of this paper, we focus
attention on single-controller games, for which equilibria can be computed by solving a single
semidefinite program.
D. SDP Characterization of Nonnegativity and Moments
Let A be a closed interval on the real line. The set of univariate polynomials which are
nonnegative on A have an exact semidefinite description. The set of (finite) vectors in Rn which
correspond to moment sequences of measures supported on A also have an exact semidefinite
description. We briefly review these notions here and introduce some related notation [6].
Let R[x] denote the set of univariate polynomials with real coefficients. Let p(x) =
∑n
k=0 pkx
k ∈
R[x]. We say that p(x) is nonnegative on A if p(x) ≥ 0 for every x ∈ A. We denote the
set of nonnegative polynomials of degree n which are nonnegative on A by P(A). (To avoid
cumbersome notation, we exclude the degree information in the notation. Moreover the degree
will usually be clear from the context.) The polynomial p(x) is said to be a sum of squares if
there exist polynomials q1(x), . . . , qk(x) such that p(x) =
∑k
i=1 qi(x)
2
. It is well known that a
univariate polynomial is a sum of squares if and only if p(x) ∈ P(R).
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Let µ denote a measure supported on the set A. The ith moment of the measure µ is denoted
by
µi =
∫
A
xidµ.
Let µ¯ = [µ0, . . . , µn] be a vector in Rn+1. We say that µ¯ is a moment sequence of length n+ 1
if it corresponds to the first n+1 moments of some nonnegative measure µ supported on the set
A. The moment space, denoted by M(A) is the subset of Rn+1 which corresponds to moments
of nonnegative measures supported on the set A. We say that a nonnegative measure µ is a
probability measure if its zeroth order moment satisfies µ0 = 1. The set of moment sequences
of length n+ 1 corresponding to probability measures is denoted by MP (A).
Let Sn denote the set of n×n symmetric matrices and define the linear operator H : R2n−1 →
Sn as:
H :


a1
a2
.
.
.
a2n−1

 7→


a1 a2 . . . an
a2 a3 . . . an+1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
an an+1 . . . a2n−1

 .
Thus H is simply the linear operator that takes a vector and constructs the associated Hankel
matrix which is constant along the antidiagonals. We will also frequently use the adjoint of this
operator, the linear map H∗ : Sn → R2n−1:
H∗ :


m11 m12 . . . m1n
m12 m22 . . . m2n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
m1n m2n . . . mnn

 7→


m11
2m12
m22 + 2m13
.
.
.
mnn


.
This map flattens a matrix into a vector by adding all the entries along antidiagonals.
Lemma 3: Let p(x) =
∑2n
k=0 pkx
k be a polynomial. Let p¯ = [p0, . . . , p2n]T be the vector of
its coefficients. Then p(x) is nonnegative (or SOS) if and only if there exists S ∈ Sn+1, S  0
such that:
p¯ = H∗(S).
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Proof: For univariate polynomials, nonnegativity is equivalent to SOS (see [9]). Let [x]n =
[1, x, . . . , xn]T . We have for every S ∈ Sn+1,
p(x) = p¯T [x]2n = H
∗(S)T [x]2n = [x]
T
nS[x]n.
Factoring S  0, we obtain a sum of squares decomposition. The converse is immediate.
One can give a similar semidefinite characterization of polynomials that are nonnegative on an
interval. Since in this paper we are typically considering the interval to be [0, 1] we give an
explicit semidefinite characterization of P([0, 1]). We define the following matrices:
L1 =

 In×n
01×n

 , L2 =

 01×n
In×n

 ,
where In×n stands for the n× n identity matrix.
Lemma 4: The polynomial p(x) =
∑2n
k=0 pkx
k is nonnegative on [0, 1] if and only if there
exist matrices Z ∈ Sn+1 and W ∈ Sn, Z  0,W  0 such that

p0
.
.
.
p2n

 = H∗(Z + 12(L1WLT2 + L2WLT1 )− L2WLT2 ).
Proof: The proof follows from the characterization of nonnegative polynomials on intervals.
It is well known that
p(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ [0, 1]⇔ p(x) = z(x) + x(1− x)w(x),
where z(x) and w(x) are sums of squares. A simple application of Lemma 3 yields the required
condition.
In this paper, we will also be using a very important classical result about the semidefinite
representation of moment spaces [10], [11]. We give an explicit characterization of M([0, 1])
and MP ([0, 1]).
Lemma 5: The vector µ¯ = [µ0, µ1, . . . , µ2n]T is a valid set of moments for a nonnegative
measure supported on [0, 1] if and only if
H(µ¯)  0
1
2
(LT1H(µ¯)L2 + L
T
2H(µ¯)L1)− L
T
2H(µ¯)L2  0.
(2)
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Moreover, it is a moment sequence corresponding to a probability measure if and only if in
addition to (2) it satisfies µ0 = 1.
Proof: The proof follows by dualizing Lemma 4. Alternatively, a direct proof may be found
in [10].
For example, for 2n = 2 the sequence [µ0, µ1, µ2] is a moment sequence corresponding to a
measure supported on [0, 1] if and only if the following inequalities are true:
 µ0 µ1
µ1 µ2

  0
µ1 − µ2 ≥ 0.
III. FINITE STRATEGY CASE
For the reader’s convenience and comparison purposes, we briefly review here the case where
each player has only finitely many strategies at each state [3]. Again, for simplicity we assume
that the set of pure strategies available to each player at each state is identical so that A1 =
A2 = {1, . . . , m}. Under the finite strategy case, when assumption SC holds, a minimax solution
may be computed via linear programming. We state the linear program in this section. In the
next section, drawing motivation from this linear program, we write an infinite dimensional
optimization problem for the case where each player has a choice from infinitely many pure
strategies. The finite action game is completely defined via the specification of the following
data:
1) The state space S = {1, . . . , S}.
2) The (finite) sets of actions for players 1 and 2 given by A1 = A2 = {1, . . . , m}.
3) The payoff function for a given state s (representable by a matrix indexed by the actions
of each players) denoted by r(s, a1, a2).
4) The probability transition matrix p(s′; s, a1) which provides the conditional probability of
transition from state s to s′ given player 1’s action a1.
5) The discount factor β.
A mixed strategy for player 1 is a function f : S × A1 → [0, 1] subject to the normalization
constraint
∑
a1
f(s, a1) = 1 for each s ∈ S (so that f(s) = [f(s, 1), . . . , f(s,m)] becomes a
probability distribution over the strategy space A1). Similarly the mixed strategy for player 2 in
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a particular state s is given by g(s) = [g(s, 1), . . . , g(s,m)]. The collection of mixed strategies
(indexed by the states) will be denoted by f = [f(1), . . . , f(S)] (and g = [g(1), . . . , g(S)]
respectively). A strategy f leads to a probability matrix P (f) = ∑a1∈A1 p(s′; s, a1)f(s, a1).
Again we consider a β-discounted process over an infinite horizon. Given strategies f and g,
the reward collected by player 1 in some stage s is given by:
r(s, f(s), g(s)) =
∑
a1∈A1,a2∈A2
r(s, a1, a2)f(s, a1)g(s, a2).
The reward collected over the infinite horizon starting at state s, vβ(s, f(s), g(s)), is given by
the system of equations:
vβ(s, f(s), g(s)) = r(s, f(s), g(s))+
β
∑
s′∈S
(∑
a1∈A1
p(s′; s, a1)f(s, a1)
)
vβ(s
′, f(s′), g(s′)).
Thus,
vβ(f , g) = (I − βP (f))
−1r(f , g),
where r(f , g) = [r(1, f(1), g(1)), . . . , r(S, f(S), g(S))] ∈ RS. The problem is to find equilibrium
strategies f0 and g0 that satisfy the Nash equilibrium property:
vβ(f , g
0) ≤ vβ(f
0, g0) ≤ vβ(f
0, g) (3)
for all mixed strategies f , g.
Theorem 2 ([3]): Consider the primal-dual pair of linear programs:
minimize
∑S
s=1 v(s)
g(s, a2), v(s)
v(s) ≥
∑
a2∈A2
r(s, a1, a2)g(s, a2)+
β
∑S
s′=1 p(s
′; s, a1)v(s
′) ∀s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1
∑
a2∈A2
g(s, a2) = 1 ∀s ∈ S
g(s, a2) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2.
(P )
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and
maximize
∑S
s=1 z(s)
x(s, a1), z(s)
∑S
s=1
∑
a1∈A1
[δ(s, s′)− βp(s′, s, a1)]x(s, a1) = 1 ∀s
′ ∈ S
z(s) ≤
∑
a1∈A1
x(s, a1)r(s, a1, a2) ∀s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2,
x(s, a1) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1.
(D)
Let p∗ be the optimal value of (P ), and d∗ be the optimal value of (D). Let x∗(s, a1) be the
optimal values of the x(s, a1) variables obtained in (D). Let
f ∗(s, a1) =
x∗(s, a1)∑
a1
x∗(s, a1)
and g∗(s, a2) be the distribution obtained by the optimal solution of (P ). Then the following
statements hold:
1) p∗ = d∗.
2) Let v∗ = [v∗(1), . . . , v∗(S)] be the optimal solution of (P ). Then v∗ = vβ(f∗, g∗).
3) vβ(f∗, g∗) satisfies the saddle-point inequality (3).
Remark Note that statement 2 claims that the solution of the LP (P ) corresponds to the infinite
horizon discounted reward obtained when players 1 and 2 play according to the distributions f∗
and g∗. Statement 3 claims that these distributions are in fact optimal for the two players in the
Nash equilibrium sense.
Proof: See [3, pp. 93].
Remark Note that the primal problem (P ) has a natural interpretation in terms of security
strategies. Feasible vectors v, and g satisfy the first set of inequalities in (P ). The inequalities
can be interpreted to mean that using strategy g the payoff of player 2 will be at most v.
October 26, 2018 DRAFT
17
IV. INFINITE STRATEGY CASE
A. Problem Setup
In this section we consider the case where each player can choose from uncountably many
different actions. In particular, each player can choose actions from the set [0, 1]. The number
of states |S| = S is still finite. The payoff function r(s, a1, a2) is a polynomial in a1 and a2 for
each s ∈ S. The single controller case (Assumption SC) is studied. In this case, we assume that
the probability of transition p(s′; s, a1) is a polynomial in a1. Again we consider the two-player
zero sum case where player 1 attempts to maximize his reward over the infinite horizon. We
generalize the problem (P ) to this case. The variables f and g representing distributions over
the finite sets A1 and A2 are replaced by measures µ(s) and ν(s). These measures represent
mixed strategies over the uncountable action spaces. (We remind the reader that for each player
there are S measures, each measure corresponding to a mixed strategy in a particular state. For
example µ(s) corresponds to the mixed strategy player 1 would adopt when the game is in state
s.)
B. Preliminary Results
We point out that the generalization of (P ) to this case is an optimization problem involving
non-negativity of a system of univariate polynomials with coefficients that depend on the mo-
ments of these measures. The interpretation in terms of security strategies for player 2 holds.
The following is the generalization of the linear program (P ) mentioned above:
minimize
∑S
s=1 v(s)
ν(s), v(s)
(a) v(s) ≥
∫
a2∈A2
r(s, a1, a2)dν(s)+
β
∑S
s′=1 p(s
′; s, a1)v(s
′) for all s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1
(b) ν(s) is a measure supported on A2 for all s ∈ S
Since
∫
r(s, a1, a2)dν(s) = qν(s, a1), a univariate polynomial in a1 for each s ∈ S, for a
fixed vector v(s), the constraints (a) are a system of polynomial inequalities. Note that the
coefficients of q will depend on the measure ν only via finitely many moments. More con-
cretely, let r(s, a1, a2) =
∑ns,ms
i,j rij(s)a
i
1a
j
2 be the payoff polynomial. Then
∫
r(s, a1, a2)dν(s) =
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∑
i,j rij(s)a
i
1νj(s). Using this observation, this problem may be rewritten as the following prob-
lem.
minimize
∑S
s=1 v(s)
ν¯(s), v(s)
(c) v(s)−
∑
i,j rij(s)a
i
1νj(s)−
β
∑S
s′=1 p(s
′; s, a1)v(s
′) ∈ P(A1) for all s ∈ S
(d) ν¯(s) ∈M(A2), and ν0(s) = 1 for all s ∈ S.
(P ′)
The constraints (c) give a system of polynomial inequalities in a1, one inequality per state. Fix
some state s. Let the degree of the inequality for that state by ds. Let [a1]ds = [1, a1, a21, . . . ads1 ].
The first term in constraint (c) can be rewritten in vector form as:∑
i,j
rij(s)a
i
1νj(s) = ν¯(s)
TR(s)T [a1]ds ,
where R(s) is a matrix that contains the coefficients of the polynomial r(s, a1, a2). Similar to
the finite strategy case we define a vector by v∗ = [v∗(1), . . . , v∗(S)]T which will turn out to be
the value vector of the stochastic game (which is indexed by the state). The second term in the
constraint (c) which depends on the probability transition p(s′; s, a1) is also a polynomial in a1
whose coefficients depend on the coefficients of p(s′; s, a1) and v. Specifically
S∑
s′=1
p(s′; s, a1)v(s
′) = vTQ(s)T [a1]ds ,
for some matrix Q(s) which contains the coefficients of p(s′; s, a1).
Lemma 6: Let A1 = A2 = [0, 1]. Let Es ∈ Rds×S be the matrix which has a 1 in the (1, s)
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position. Then the semidefinite program (SP ) given by:
minimize
∑S
s=1 v(s)
ν¯(s), v(s)
(e) H∗(Zs +
1
2
(L1WsL
T
2 + L2WsL
T
1 )− L2WsL
T
2 )
= Esv − βQ(s)v −R(s)ν¯(s) ∀s ∈ S
(f) H(ν¯(s))  0 ∀s ∈ S
(g) 1
2
(
L1
TH(ν¯)(s)L2 + L
T
2H(ν¯)(s)L1
)
−L2
TH(ν¯)(s)L2  0 ∀s ∈ S
(h) e1
T ν¯(s) = 1 ∀s ∈ S
(i) Zs,Ws  0 ∀s ∈ S
(SP )
exactly solves the polynomial optimization problem (P ′).
Proof: The polynomial in inequality (c) has the coefficient vector Esv−βQ(s)v−R(s)ν¯(s).
The proof follows as a direct consequence of Lemma 4 concerning the semidefinite representation
of polynomials nonnegative over [0, 1], and Lemma 5 concerning the semidefinite representation
of moment sequences of nonnegative measures supported on [0, 1].
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The dual of (SP ) is given by the following semidefinite program:
maximize
∑S
s=1 α(s)
α(s), ξ¯(s)
(j) H∗(As +
1
2
(L1BsL
T
2 + L2BsL
T
1 )− L2BsL
T
2 ) =
RTs ξ¯(s)− α(s)e1 ∀s ∈ S
(k) H(ξ¯(s))  0 ∀s ∈ S
(l) 1
2
(
L1
TH(ξ¯(s))L2 + L
T
2H(ξ¯(s))L1
)
−
L2
TH(ξ¯(s))L2  0 ∀s ∈ S
∑
s(Es − βQ(s))
T ξ¯(s) = 1
(m) As, Bs  0 ∀s ∈ S.
(SD)
Lemma 7: The dual SDP (SD) is equivalent to the following polynomial optimization prob-
lem:
maximize
∑S
s=1 α(s)
α(s), ξ¯(s)
(n)
∑
i,j rij(s)ξi(s)a
j
2 − α(s) ≥ 0 ∀a2 ∈ A2, s ∈ S
(o) ξ¯(s) ∈ M(A2) ∀s ∈ S
(p)
∑
s
∫
A1
(δ(s, s′)− βp(s′, s, a1))dξ(s) = 1 ∀s
′ ∈ S.
(D′)
Proof: This again follows as a consequence of Lemmas 4 and 5.
Remark Note that in the dual problem, the moment sequences do not necessarily correspond to
probability measures. Hence, to convert them to probability measures, one needs to normalize
the measure. Upon normalization, one obtains the optimal strategy for player 1.
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Lemma 8: The polynomial optimization problems (P ′) and (D′) are strong duals of each
other.
Proof: We prove this by showing that the semidefinite program (SP ) satisfies Slater’s
constraint qualification and that it is bounded from below. The result then follows from the
strong duality of the equivalent semidefinite programs (SP ) and (SD).
First pick µ(s) and ν(s) to be the uniform distribution on [0, 1] for each state s ∈ S. One can
show [10] that the moment sequence of µ is in the interior of the moment space of [0, 1]. As a
consequence, constraints (f) and (g) are strictly positive definite. Using the strategies µ and ν,
evaluate the discounted value of this pair of strategies as:
vβ(µ, ν) = [I − βP (µ)]
−1r(µ, ν).
Choose v > vβ. The polynomial inequalities given by (c) are all strictly positive and thus
constraints (i) are strictly positive definite. The equality constraints are trivially satisfied.
To prove that the problem is bounded below, we note that r(s, a1, a2) is a polynomial and that
the strategy spaces for both players are bounded. Hence,
inf
a1∈A1,a2∈A2
r(s, a1, a2)
is finite and provides a trivial lower bound for v(s).
Lemma 9: Let ν¯∗(s) and ξ¯∗(s) be optimal moment sequences for (P ′) and (D′) respectively.
Let ν∗(s) and ξ∗(s) be the corresponding measures supported on A1 and A2 respectively. The
following complementary slackness results hold for the optima of (P ′) and (D′):
v∗(s)
∫
A1
dξ∗(s) =
∫
A2
∫
A1
r(s, a1, a2)dξ
∗(s)dν∗(s)+
β
∑
s′ v
∗(s′)
∫
A1
p(s′; s, a1)dξ
∗(s) ∀s ∈ S
(4)
α∗(s)
∫
A2
dν∗(s) =
∫
A2
∫
A1
r(s, a1, a2)dξ
∗(s)dν∗(s)
∀s ∈ S.
(5)
Proof: The result follows from the strong duality of the equivalent semidefinite representa-
tions of the primal-dual pair (P ′)− (D′). The Lagrangian function for (P ′) is given by:
L(ξ, α) = inf
v,ν{
∑S
s=1 v(s)−
∫
A1
[v(s)−
∫
A2
r(s, a1, a2)dν(s)
−β
∑
s′ v(s
′)p(s′; s, a1)]dξ(s) +
∑
s α(s)(1− ν0(s))}.
L(ξ, α) must satisfy weak duality, i.e. d∗ ≤ p∗. At optimality p∗ =
∑
s v
∗(s) for some vector
v∗. However, strong duality holds, i.e. p∗ = d∗. This forces the first complementary slackness
October 26, 2018 DRAFT
22
relation. The second relation is obtained similarly by considering the Lagrangian of the dual
problem.
We have shown that problem (P ′) can be reduced to the semidefinite program (SP ), and
is thus computationally tractable via convex optimization algorithms. We next show that the
solution to problem (P ′) is in fact the desired equilibrium solution.
C. Main Theorem
Let p∗ be the optimal value of (P ′), and d∗ be the optimal value of (D′). Let ν∗(s) and ξ∗(s)
be the optimal measures recovered in (P ′) and (D′). Let
µ∗(s) =
ξ∗(s)∫
A1
dξ∗(s)
.
so that µ∗ is a normalized version of ξ∗ (i.e. µ∗ is a probability measure). Let v∗ be the vector
obtained as the optimal solution of (P ′).
Theorem 3: The optimal solutions to the primal-dual pair (P ′), (D′) satisfy the following:
1) p∗ = d∗.
2) v∗ = vβ(µ∗, ν∗).
3) vβ(µ∗, ν∗) satisfies the saddle-point inequality:
vβ(µ, ν
∗) ≤ vβ(µ
∗, ν∗) ≤ vβ(µ
∗, ν) (6)
for all mixed strategies µ, ν.
Proof:
1) Follows from the strong duality of the primal-dual pair (P ′)− (D′).
2) Using Lemma 9 equation (4) in normalized form (i.e. dividing throughout by ξ∗0(s), which
is the zeroth order moment of the measure ξ(s)) we obtain
v∗(s) =
∫
A2
∫
A1
r(s, a1, a2)dµ
∗(s)dν∗(s)+
β
∑
s′ v
∗(s′)
∫
A1
p(s′; s, a1)dµ
∗(s) ∀s ∈ S.
Upon simplification and vectorization of v∗(s) one obtains
v∗ = r(µ∗, ν∗) + βP (µ∗)v∗.
Using a Bellman equation argument or by simply iterating this equation (i.e. substituting
repeatedly for v∗) it is easy to see that v∗ = vβ(µ∗, ν∗).
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3) Consider inequality (c) it at its optimal value. We have for every state s:
v∗(s) ≥
∫
a2∈A2
r(s, a1, a2)dν
∗(s)+
β
∑S
s′=1 p(s
′; s, a1)v
∗(s′).
Integrating with respect to some arbitrary probability measure µ(s) (with support on A1),
we get:
v∗(s) ≥
∫
A2
∫
A1
r(s, a1, a2)dµ(s)dν
∗(s)+
β
∑S
s′=1
∫
A1
p(s′; s, a1)v
∗(s′)dµ(s).
Thus,
v∗(s) ≥ r(s, µ(s), ν∗(s))+
β
∑S
s′=1
∫
A1
p(s′; s, a1)v
∗(s′)dµ(s).
Iterating this equation, we obtain vβ(µ∗, ν∗) = v∗ ≥ vβ(µ, ν∗) for every strategy µ. This
completes one side of the saddle point inequality.
Using the normalized version of equation (5), we get:
α∗(s)
ξ∗
0
(s)
=
∫
A2
∫
A1
r(s, a1, a2)dµ
∗(s)dν∗(s)
= r(s, µ∗(s), ν∗(s)).
If we integrate inequality (n) in problem (D′) with respect to any arbitrary probability
measure ν(s) with support on A2 we obtain
α∗(s)
ξ∗0(s)
≤ r(s, µ∗(s), ν(s)).
Thus r(s, µ∗(s), ν∗(s)) ≤ r(s, µ∗(s), ν(s)) for every s. Multiplying throughout by (I −
βP (µ∗))−1, we get vβ(µ∗, ν∗) ≤ vβ(µ∗, ν). This completes the other side of the saddle
point inequality.
D. Obtaining the measures
Solutions to the semidefinite programs (SP ) and (SD) provide the moment sequences corre-
sponding to optimal strategies. Additional computation is required to recover the actual measures.
We briefly describe a classical procedure to recover the measures using linear algebra. For more
details, the reader may refer to [11], [12].
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Let µ¯ ∈ R2n be a given moment sequence. We wish to find a nonnegative measure µ supported
on the real line with these moments. The resulting measure will be composed of finitely many
atoms (i.e. a discrete measure) of the form ∑wiδ(x− ai) where
Prob(x = ai) = wi ∀i.
Construct the following linear system:


µ0 µ1 . . . µn−1
µ1 µ2 . . . µn
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
µn−1 µn . . . µ2n−2




c0
c1
.
.
.
cn−1

 = −


µn
µn+1
.
.
.
µ2n−1

 .
Note that the Hankel matrix that appears on the left hand side is a sub-matrix of H(µ¯). We
assume without loss of generality that the above matrix is strictly positive definite. (Suppose the
above matrix is not full rank, construct a smaller k×k linear system of equations by eliminating
the last n − k rows and columns of the matrix so that the k × k submatrix is full rank, and
therefore strictly positive definite.) By inverting this matrix we solve for [c0, . . . , cn−1]T . Let xi
be the roots of the polynomial equation
xn + cn−1x
n−1 + · · ·+ c1x+ c0 = 0.
It can be shown that the xi are all real and distinct, and that they are the support points of the
discrete measure. Once the supports are obtained, the weights wi may be obtained by solving
the nonsingular Vandermonde system given by:
n∑
i=1
wix
j
i = µj (0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1).
V. EXAMPLE
Consider the two player discounted stochastic game with β = 0.5, S = {1, 2} with payoff
function r(1, a1, a2) = (a1 − a2)2 and r(2, a1, a2) = −(a1 − a2)2. Let the probability transition
matrix be given by:
P (a1) =

 a1 1− a1
1− a21 a
2
1

 .
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 2
a1
a21
21
 (a 1 − a2 )2 −(a1− a2 )
2
1−a
 1
1−a
 1
Fig. 2. A two state stochastic game with transition probabilities dependent only on the action of Player 1. The payoffs associated
to the states are indicated in the corresponding nodes. The edges are marked by the corresponding state transition probabilities.
Figure 2 graphically illustrates this stochastic game, consisting of two states (the nodes) with
polynomial transition probabilities dependent on a1 (as marked on the edges of the graph). Within
the nodes, the payoffs associated to the corresponding states are indicated.
To understand this game, consider first the zero-sum (nonstochastic game) with payoff function
p(a1, a2) = (a1 − a2)
2 over the strategy space [0, 1]. This game (called the “guessing game”)
was studied by Parrilo in [6]. If Player 2 is able to guess the action of Player 1, he can simply
imitate his action (i.e. set a2 = a1 and his payoff to player 1 would be zero (this is the minimum
possible since (a1 − a2)2 ≥ 0). Player 1 would try to confuse player 2 as much as possible and
thus randomize between the extreme actions a1 = 0 and a1 = 1 with a probability of 12 . Player
2’s best response would be to play a2 = 12 with probability 1.
In the game described in Fig. 2, in State 1 Player 1 plays the role of confuser and Player 2
plays the role of guesser. In state 2, the roles of the players are reversed, Player 1 is the guesser
and Player 2 the confuser. However, the problem is complicated a bit by the fact that State 1
is advantageous to Player 1 so that at every stage he has incentive to play a strategy that gives
him a good payoff as well as maximize the chances of transitioning to State 1.
The polynomial optimization problem that computes the minimax strategies and the equilib-
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rium values is the following:
minimize v(1) + v(2)
v(1) ≥
∫
(a1 − a2)
2dν(1)+
β(a1v(1) + (1− a1)v(2)) ∀a1 ∈ [0, 1]
v(2) ≥ −
∫
(a1 − a2)
2dν(2)+
β((1− a21)v(1) + a
2
1v(2)) ∀a1 ∈ [0, 1]
ν(1), ν(2) probability measures supported on [0, 1].
This problem can be reformulated as follows:
minimize v(1) + v(2)
v(1) ≥ a21 − 2a1ν1(1) + ν2(1)+
β(a1v(1) + (1− a1)v(2)) ∀a1 ∈ [0, 1]
v(2) ≥ −a21 + 2a1ν1(2)− ν2(2)+
β((1− a21)v(1) + a
2
1v(2)) ∀a1 ∈ [0, 1]
[1, ν1(1), ν2(1)]
T
, [1, ν1(2), ν2(2)]
T ∈M([0, 1]).
Solving the SDP and its dual we obtain the following optimal cost-to-go and optimal moment
sequences:
v∗ = [.298,−.158]T
µ¯∗(1) = [1, .614, .614]T µ¯∗(2) = [1, .5, .25]T
ν¯∗(1) = [1, .614, .377]T ν¯∗(2) = [1, .614, .614]T .
The corresponding measures obtained as explained in subsection IV-D are supported at only
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finitely many points, and are given by the following:
µ∗(1) = .386 δ(a1) + .614 δ(a1 − 1)
µ∗(2) = δ(a1 − .5)
ν∗(1) = δ(a2 − .614)
ν∗(2) = .386 δ(a2) + .614 δ(a2 − 1).
Consider, for example, play in State 1. If Player 1 were playing obliviously with respect to
the state transitions, he would play actions a1 = 0 and a1 = 1 with one half probability each.
However, to increase the probability of staying in State 1 he plays action 1 with a higher
probability. Player 2 cannot affect the state transition probabilities directly, thus he must play a
myopic best response. (A myopic best response is one that is a best response for the game in the
current state). Note that in state 1, once Player 1’s strategy is fixed, the (only) best response for
Player 2 is to play the action a2 = 0.614 with probability 1. In state 2, player 1’s best strategy
is to play a1 = 0.5. Player 2 picks an action from his myopic best response set (in this case, all
probability distributions that are supported on the points 0 and 1).
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a technique for solving two-player, zero-sum finite state
stochastic games with infinite strategies and polynomial payoffs. We established the existence of
equilibria for such games. As a by-product we got an algorithm that converged to unique value
vector of the game (however this algorithm does not seem to have very attractive convergence
rates). We focused mainly on the case where the single-controller assumption holds. We showed
that the problem can be reduced to solving a system of univariate polynomial inequalities and
moment constraints. We used techniques from the classical theory of moments and sum-of-
squares to reduce the problem to a semidefinite programming problem. By solving a primal-dual
pair of semidefinite programs, we obtained minimax equilibria and optimal strategies for the
players.
It is known that finite-state, finite action, two-player zero-sum games which satisfy the or-
derfield property [13], [5] may be solved via linear programming. The single-controller case,
games with perfect information, switching controller stochastic games, separable reward-state
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independent transition (SER-SIT) games and additive games all satisfy this property. We intend
to extend these cases to the infinite strategy case with polynomial payoffs. General finite action
stochastic games which do not satisfy the orderfield property still have an interesting math-
ematical structure, but efficient computational procedures are not available. Developing such
procedures present an interesting direction of future research.
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bringing to their attention the linear programming solution to single controller finite stochastic
games.
REFERENCES
[1] D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic programming and optimal control. Athena Scientific, 2005, vol. I.
[2] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
[3] J. A. Filar and K. Vrieze, Competitive Markov decision processes. New York: Springer, 1997.
[4] L. S. Shapley, “Stochastic games,” Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U. S. A., vol. 39, pp. 1095–1100, 1953.
[5] T. Parthasarathy and T. E. S. Raghavan, “An orderfield property for stochastic games when one player controls transition
probabilities,” J. Optim. Theory Appl., vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 375–392, 1981.
[6] P. A. Parrilo, “Polynomial games and sum of squares optimization,” in Proceedings of the 45th IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control, 2006.
[7] N. Stein, A. Ozdaglar, and P. A. Parrilo, “Separable and low-rank continuous games,” in Proceedings of the 45th IEEE
Conference on Decision and Control, 2006.
[8] M. Dresher, S. Karlin, and L. S. Shapley, “Polynomial games,” in Contributions to the Theory of Games, ser. Annals of
Mathematics Studies, no. 24. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1950, pp. 161–180.
[9] P. A. Parrilo, “Structured semidefinite programs and semialgebraic geometry methods in robustness and optimization,”
Ph.D. dissertation, California Institute of Technology, May 2000.
[10] S. Karlin and L. Shapley, Geometry of moment spaces, ser. Memoirs of the American Mathematical Society. AMS, 1953,
vol. 12.
[11] J. A. Shohat and J. D. Tamarkin, The Problem of Moments, ser. American Mathematical Society Mathematical surveys,
vol. II. New York: American Mathematical Society, 1943.
[12] L. Devroye, Nonuniform random variate generation. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986.
[13] T. E. S. Raghavan and J. A. Filar, “Algorithms for stochastic games—a survey,” Z. Oper. Res., vol. 35, no. 6, pp. 437–472,
1991.
October 26, 2018 DRAFT
